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 1 Introduction 
During the last ten years, active labour market policies (ALMPs) constituted a substantial part 
of the efforts governments put into fighting long-term unemployment. Employment subsidies 
– i.e. firms get a subsidy whenever they take on long-term unemployed − comprise a 
considerable part of ALMP. Figure 1 shows that their share increased from 32 per cent in 
1990 of expenditures on active labour market policies in the Netherlands to 56 per cent in 
2001. Bearing in mind that the expenditures on ALMP increased from two to six billion euros 
in the same period, shows the magnitude of these programs (SZW 2001). But why would a 
government want to subsidize employment for jobseekers that firms do not want to hire? 
From an economic point of view, this can only be justified whenever there are market 
failures. 
Figure 1 Share of employment subsidies in total expenditures on ALMP, the 
Netherlands 1990-2001 
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Source: SZW (2001). General employment subsidies comprise tax exemptions employers receive for all employees they employ at a wage at or just above the 
minimum wage (for example SPAK). LTU employment subsidy schemes are targeted at long term unemployed only. Part of the money is spent on job creation 
in the public sector. The rest is available for employers in the private sector who hire long term unemployed (WIW, I/D, VLW). Protected unemployment aims 
at creating jobs for disabled unemployed who will not find a non subsidized job (WSW). 
In our view market failures can arise since firms cannot observe ability levels of 
jobseekers without a cost, due to asymmetric information. In order to minimize hiring 
costs firms use screening devices. However, the use of such devices leads employers 
to disregard some jobseekers with sufficient ability levels. This constitutes a market 
failure, and government intervention by means of employment subsidies can be 
justified. 
The Dutch economy experienced some considerable changes during the last decade. 
In the early nineties, the unemployment rate fluctuated around 6 to 7%, but at the end 
of the decade it declined to around 3% (CBS, 2001). The tightening of the labour 
market has consequences for the screening standards used by firms. Firms can be less 
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choosy, which means that long-term unemployed, who were fallaciously disregarded 
in an easy labour market, will be taken into consideration when the labour market 
tightens. Moreover the tightening of the labour market has encouraged a more tailor-
made approach to employment subsidies. We analyze how both the tightening of the 
labour market and the policy change affect the success of employment subsidies.  
2 Modeling hiring behavior using screening devices 
Weiss (1980) was one of the first to model firm hiring behaviour under information 
asymmetry. According to Weiss, productivity differences between jobseekers can be 
attributed to costless observable and costly observable characteristics. Costless 
observable characteristics are for example the attained education level of workers, 
whereas costly observable characteristics are for instance innate abilities. Both 
characteristics together determine total abilities and hence productivity. Employers 
are looking for the most productive jobseekers and therefore need to get grip on these 
costly observable characteristics. One way to be able to select highly productive 
workers is to offer high wages. Weiss points at the fact that workers having high 
productivity levels will also have high reservation wages. Hence offering high wages 
will increase the share of highly productive workers amongst the applicants. 
Guasch and Weiss (1980) propose a second approach to solve information 
asymmetries. They introduce ability tests, which enable firms to locate the most 
productive workers (tests on a pass/fail basis). Guasch and Weiss argue that the most 
productive workers will be most confident of passing the test and hence are more 
likely to do the test. They show that there might be a testing equilibrium in which at 
least part of the higher productivity workers are screened.1 
Greenwald (1986) proposed a third route to solve the problem of asymmetrical 
information. Greenwald argues that employers introduce probationary contracts. 
During such a probationary period, the employer observes the otherwise ‘hidden’ 
abilities of workers. At the end of this period the employer decides whether to 
continue the employment relation or not, based on the abilities of the worker. By 
doing so, employers categorize the unemployment pool. Workers that lose their job at 
the end of the probationary period and return to the unemployment pool inadvertently 
                                                 
1 See also Guasch and Weiss (1981). 
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“signal” to other employers that they do not have high ‘hidden’ abilities.2 
Consequently their chances on reemployment diminish. The categorization of workers 
also reflects in the wage. During the probationary period, the employer pays wages 
equal to the average marginal product of all workers concerned. At the end of the 
period, the employer picks out workers having high abilities and pays them 
accordingly, whereas the fired workers find themselves in a “second hand” labour 
market where below probationary period wages prevail. 
These three models have in common that they rely on self-selection among 
jobseekers. “Entry barriers” like a probationary period, ability tests and to a lesser 
extent offering high wages deter unqualified. That is, it is not the employer who 
selects potential employees, it is the employees who self-select. The existence of self-
selection leads the authors to ignore to a certain degree the actual hiring process – 
starting from posting a vacancy to actually filling it – firms undertake. Although we 
do not want to underestimate the importance of self-selection, the substantial 
expenditures firms devote to human resource management point at the difficulties 
firms face when trying to fill a vacancy (see for example Hale (1998)). Therefore we 
focus on the hiring decision process firms undergo to fill a vacancy. 
Information asymmetry induces screening devices 
We assume a competitive labour market in which there are I identical firms. Next to 
these firms there are J jobseekers, who differ with respect to their ability level αj. 
Firms want to secure a certain minimum productivity level ph. However, information 
asymmetry prevents firms from observing the ability of an applicant and hence her 
productivity. Only during a thorough and costly assessment procedure firms can 
determine the true ability level of a jobseeker. 
Figure 2 represents the hiring procedure, which starts when the firm posts a vacancy. 
This announcement will yield a rate of contacts of applicants. Since the firm is not 
able to assess the abilities of applicants right away, it will screen applicants using 
some easy obtainable device t. 
                                                 
2 Waldman (1984) notes that firms not only use the post-period 1 job match results at other firms to 
infer the abilities of workers, but also the pre-period 1 job assignments at other firms. Here we discard 
this possibility. 
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The relevance of screening in hiring decisions has lead to an ongoing debate in the 
empirical literature: the screening versus human capital debate. The general consensus 
now is that screening plays a role in hiring decisions – see for example Taubman and 
Wales (1973), Wolpin (1977), Albrecht (1981), Miller and Volker (1984) and Lang 
and Kropp (1986). However, these authors refer to the level of education as a 
screening device. Lynch (1985), Lynch (1989), Van den Berg and Ours (1996) and 
especially Omori (1997) show that firms also use unemployment duration as a 
screening device. In our view this is a relevant practice, which we will further analyse. 
Figure 2 Overview of the hiring procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An applicant who does not meet the screening device standard th (for instance “no 
more than one year unemployed”) will be rejected immediately; otherwise the 
applicant enters the assessment procedure. In the latter case the applicant will be 
assessed thoroughly and her true ability level will be revealed. When her ability level 
is sufficient and hence productivity exceeds ph, the applicant will be accepted for the 
job and the hiring procedure closes. Otherwise the applicant will not be accepted and 
hence the firm has to start the hiring procedure all over again with another applicant.3 
To function as a useful screening device, there needs to be a high correlation between 
the screening device and the unobservable characteristic. From a theoretical point of 
                                                 
3 The possibility that a worker meets th but not ph shows that the screening device is no perfect indicator 
of ability/productivity. If it would be, there would be no asymmetric information anymore. 
p<ph 
p>ph 
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view, there are at least two reasons why unemployment duration and productivity 
levels are negatively correlated. Firstly, the duration dependence argument explains 
why there is a negative relation between productivity and unemployment duration. 
Non-use of skills during unemployment spells leads to atrophy of skills and hence to 
productivity loss. Secondly, heterogeneity explains this negative relationship. The 
most productive workers will find a job quickly, leaving the less productive workers 
in the unemployment pool, whose share in the total jobseekers pool therefore 
increases as unemployment duration increases.  
In our analysis we will not include heterogeneity effects as including them would lead 
to complicating the model without enriching it. The negative relationship between 
unemployment duration and productivity therefore solely stems from atrophy. 
Productivity declines with unemployment duration 
Firms want to secure a certain minimum productivity level ph. Although, they cannot 
observe the productivity of a worker, pj, nor her innate ability, αj, the employer knows 
the distribution of abilities over all workers. The ability of a worker only corresponds 
to her productivity when she has not been unemployed. During unemployment the 
potential productivity depreciates at a rate ω. Hence we assume the following link 
between ability and productivity for worker j: 
(1) 1 ( , ) (0, ) 0, 0, 0, 0, 0j j j j t tt tp t and α αω α α ω α ω ω ω ω = − = > > < <   
We briefly elaborate on the properties of the depreciation of abilities, since they 
condition the results of the rest of the paper. 
The first property, ωt > 0, indicates the positive relation between productivity 
depreciation and unemployment duration. Skills get outdated following non-use and 
hence productivity declines. The empirical literature on post intermittence wage 
declines confirms this – see for example Mincer and Ofek (1982), Mincer and 
Polachek (1978), Kim and Polachek (1984) and Albrecht et al. (1998). But not only 
economists find this negative relationship, also psychologists do (Arthur et al., 1998). 
The second property, ωα > 0, assures a positive relation between productivity 
depreciation and ability level. High ability workers face a higher productivity 
depreciation rate than low ability workers following a given spell of unemployment. 
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Albrecht et al. (1998) and Neumann and Weiss (1995) find empirical support for this 
hypothesis.4 
The third property, ωtt < 0, implies a diminishing increase in productivity loss as 
unemployment duration continues. The rationale behind this feature follows from the 
second property, which intuitively says: the more productive you are, the more there 
is to lose. 
The fourth and final property, ωαt < 0, opens the possibility to model the productivity 
loss process in such a way that individuals having high abilities remain more 
productive than individuals having low abilities for a given t. 
Every unemployed has a personal combination of αj and tj, which together determine 
her productivity pj. We assume that employers can observe the duration of 
unemployment of applicants. Since they also know the distribution of abilities of 
workers, they can infer from that the distribution over workers with respect to 
productivity and duration, x(p, t).5 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of productivity loss following non-use of skills. At 
unemployment duration t=0, we observe the productivity level of individuals who 
were fired in the current period. As firing is assumed to be a random process,6 these 
individuals are a representation of the productivity distribution of employees. Their 
productivity ranges from pmin(0) to pmax(0). 
                                                 
4 We abstract in this paper from unemployment spells originating from earlier completed spells of 
unemployment. 
5 Note that not only individuals having the same ability level and unemployment duration face the same 
productivity level. If person A has an ability surplus over person B, this surplus (in productivity terms) 
could be wiped out by a longer spell of unemployment. 
6 Job separation follows job-specific idiosyncratic shocks, which make the job not productive anymore 
and hence the job breaks down, regardless the (innate) ability level of the employee carrying out the 
job. These shocks occur at probability λ. 
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Figure 3 Link between unemployment duration and productivity 
 
 
As the unemployment spell increases, skill atrophy causes productivity to decline, 
which is represented by the two downward sloping dotted curves. The upper dotted 
curve represents the productivity depreciation of the highest ability worker: 
(2) max max( )
atp t eα −=  
Hence a is the per period depreciation rate of the highest ability worker and for a 
given unemployment duration t it produces the highest productivity level available. 
The lower dotted curve represents productivity depreciation of the lowest ability 
worker: 
(3) min min( )
ctp t e and a cα −= >  
For a given t, this function delivers the lowest possible productivity level. Since high 
ability workers experience more productivity deterioration following non-use of skills 
than low ability workers, ωα > 0 in equation (1), a must be larger than c.  
The productivity distribution 
The maximum and minimum productivity level given unemployment duration define 
the boundaries of x(p,t), the distribution of workers in the unemployment pool over 
D 
C 
B 
A 
pmin(th) 
pmaxe-at 
pmin(0) 
pmax(0) 
t= th unemployment duration 
ph 
productivity   
pmine-ct 
pmax(th) 
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productivity. The highest productivity level that can be found in the unemployment 
pool is pmax(0), which is an unemployed having the maximum ability level, αmax, and 
no unemployment record. The lowest possible productivity level in the unemployment 
pool must be pmin(T), where T is the maximum duration of unemployment. 
We assume the intelligence distribution over the population to be a Bell curve, which 
empirically appears to be close to a normal distribution – cf  Herrnstein and Murray 
(1994). Since we assume entry into unemployment to be random, each cross section 
of x(p,t) in Figure 3 at a particular unemployment duration will be Bell-shaped.7 
Figure 4 presents the productivity distribution of unemployed experiencing th periods 
of unemployment, x(p;th), as a simplified version of the Bell curve. It is obvious that 
the mode productivity level of x(p;th) is decreasing in th, as productivity depreciation 
follows non-use of skills. 
Figure 4 Productivity distribution given t 
pr 
x(p;th) 
pmax(th) pmin(th) 
productivity given t=th 
 
Unemployment duration as a screening device 
The longer unemployment spells last, the lower the productivity level on average 
becomes. Therefore using unemployment duration as a screening device increases the 
probability that a firm meets a qualified job applicant. In the absence of using a 
screening device the probability to immediately find a qualified worker is 1/[1 + (B + 
C)/(A + D)] – cf Figure 3, where A, B, C and D represent the surfaces of four different 
areas. Setting a screening device standard th increases this probability to 1/[1 + B/D]. 
Crucial in this respect is that this probability will only be higher when B/D < (B + 
                                                 
7 Here we make the assumption that there is a close link between intelligence and innate ability, which 
enables us to present x(p;t) as a (simplified) normal distribution, too. 
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C)/(A + D). This is the case whenever the reduction of “type 1 error” costs (retaining 
unqualified jobseekers in the selection process) outweighs the increasing costs of 
generating “type 2 errors” (excluding qualified jobseekers from the selection process).  
By imposing a screening device standard th, only unemployed experiencing th or less 
than th periods of unemployment remain relevant for a job (those to the left of th in 
Figure 3). Hence decreasing th, increases the share of qualified unemployed in the 
unscreened pool. Let the function s of t be the distribution of unemployment duration 
of the jobseekers pool, i.e.: 
(4) 
max
min
( )
( )
( ) ( , )
p t
p t
s t x p t dp= ∫  
Then the share of unemployed eligible to be screened, i.e. the screening survival rate, 
equals: 
(5) 
max
min
( )
0 0 ( )
( ) ( ) ( , )
h h p tt t t t
h
t t p t
S t s t dt x p t dp dt
= =
= =
 = =    ∫ ∫ ∫  
Figure 5 shows this process in a different way, using a cumulative distribution of 
productivity of all job seekers: 
(6) 
0
( ; 0, ) ( , )
ht
hf p t x p t dt= ∫  
The productivity distribution ranges from pmin(T) to pmax(0). And the probability of 
finding a qualified applicant is 1/[1 + (B + C)/(A + D)]. When the hiring standard th 
is introduced, the cumulative distribution is reduced. The maximum productivity level 
remains pmax(0). However, the minimum productivity level increases due to the use of 
the screening device to pmin(th) – this is elaborated in the annex to the paper. As a 
consequence, the probability to find a qualified applicant increases to 1/[1 + B/D]. In 
this case the condition B/D < (B + C)/(A + D) follows from the shift of the 
distribution to the right. 
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Figure 5 Introducing a screening device 
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Hiring costs and optimal screening 
The firm will encounter two types of hiring costs; the costs of carrying out an 
assessment k and per period foregone productivity z.8 The latter costs refer to the 
productivity loss of a vacancy.9 Total hiring costs equal the average cost per 
assessment times the average number of assessments needed to find a qualified 
jobseeker.  
Since labour market tightness might cause vacancies difficult to fill when a strict 
screening device is used, an applicant might not be available in every period the firm 
has a vacancy. Therefore total z costs do not have to be in line with the number of 
assessments carried out.  
To model the arrival rate of applicants we use a stochastic job model (Pissarides, 
2000). After the firm has posted a vacancy, jobseekers start contacting the firm. The 
contact rate q is by definition the number of contacts m.l over the number of vacancies 
                                                 
8 We abstract from other costs like the costs related to posting the vacancy, as their contribution to total 
hiring costs is small. Implicit to our reasoning is that we assume that posting a vacancy will eventually 
lead to filling it. However, the time span between opening and filling the vacancy remains unknown. 
9 Which we define to be a fraction, κ, of ph. Since ph is no endogenous variable in our model, z is 
neither.  
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v.l.10 Using the notion of a matching function, the rate of contacts q depends 
negatively on labour market tightness θ, which is defined as v/u:11 
(7) ( , ) ( ,1) ( )ml ul vl um m q
vl vl vl v
θ
−
= = =  
However, since the firm uses unemployment duration as a screening device – cf 
equation (5) – the product of the screening survival rate S(th) and the arrival rate q(θ), 
gives the final arrival rate: 
(8) ( ) ( )hS t q θ  
The average total costs incurred during an assessment then are: 
(9) 
( ) ( )h
zk
S t q θ+  
A more stringent screening device standard leads to a smaller final arrival rate which 
leads to more forgone productivity and hence to higher per assessment costs: a typical 
type 2 error. 
The firm is interested in keeping the number of assessments it has to complete to find 
a qualified worker (p>ph) low. Therefore, the success rate of assessments needs to be 
high – i.e. the probability that an applicant who enters the assessment procedure 
indeed meets the productivity standard, which is a reduction in type 1 errors. The 
success rate of a firm setting t= th follows from equation (6): 
(10) 
max
0,( ; 0, ) 1 ( )
h
h
p
h t h
p
f p t dp F p= −∫  
As the average number of assessments needed to find a qualified worker is the inverse 
of the success rate of the assessment procedure, total hiring costs H(th) are defined by: 
 
)11(
)()()(1
1)(
,0 

 +−= θqtS
zk
pF
tH hht
h
h
 
                                                 
10 Where m is the number of jobseekers that apply for the job as a fraction of the labour force l and v is 
the number of vacant jobs as a fraction of l. 
11 We exclude “on the job search”, which means that all jobseekers experience positive unemployment 
spells. 
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The right-hand side of the equation indicates the trade-off, which the firm faces. A 
higher hiring standard increases the success rate (reduces type 1 errors) but at the 
same time increases the per assessment costs (higher type 2 errors). The firm will 
choose its optimal screening standard, th*, such that hiring costs are minimised. In the 
Annex we show that th* will increase when the labour market becomes tighter. In that 
case it is optimal for firms to relax their screening standards. 
Wage determination and market failures 
Given the screening standard, th*, the wage level is determined in a Nash bargain 
between employers and employees. Depending on the bargaining strength of both 
parties, the wage will be a weighted average of on the one side the outside option and 
on the other side the productivity level of the employee plus the hiring costs the firm 
incurred. If the employers have full bargaining strength, the wage equals the outside 
option. If the employees have full bargaining strength, the wage equals productivity 
plus hiring costs – since the firm has to incur hiring costs again if wage negotiations 
break down. 
Actually, the hiring standard th might influence the wage outcome, since it defines the 
relevant share of the unemployment pool and it also influences the outside option. 
However, these are aggregate effects and it seems reasonable to assume that 
individual firms will not take these into account. Figure 6 shows how the optimal 
screening device standard, th*, defines the fraction of all unemployed which are taken 
into consideration. This means that the labour supply curve is cut off at E0, and a 
wage w0 results as the outcome of the bargaining process.12 
Although th* is optimal from the firm’s point of view, it is socially not. Unemployed 
who do not meet th*, but who do meet ph, are excluded from the hiring procedure. 
These unemployed pay a price for the inaccuracy of the screening device. But since 
the firm does not face the externalities (i.e. unemployment benefits) of this type 1 
error, it does not take these costs into consideration when setting th. Hence, we are 
dealing with a market failure. 
                                                 
12 For expositional simplicity we have drawn vertical lines in the figure, of course these should be 
increasing, depending on the bargaining strength of employees. 
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Figure 6 The effects of the screening device standard on the employment outcome 
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To internalise the market failure, the government has to induce the firm to increase th 
to say th’. As hiring costs are higher after th*, the only option to induce firms to 
increase th is to subsidize the increase in the hiring costs. Following subsidization, the 
firm will increase th and subsequently take (part of) the unemployed in area A (see 
Figure 3) into consideration for the job. In Figure 6 this means that labour supply 
increases to ls(th’), which leads to a wage reduction and hence an increase in 
employment. This increase in employment and consequently decrease in government 
expenditures on unemployment benefits could be used to finance the subsidy.13 
3 Employment subsidies to correct market failures  
Employment subsidies can encourage firms to recruit from long-term unemployed for 
different reasons. We discuss two forms of subsidies: compensation for increased 
hiring costs, and schooling or training subsidies. In both cases a temporary or once 
and for all subsidy can lead to permanent job creation. 
Compensation for increased hiring costs 
The objective of the government is to persuade firms to recruit from unemployed in 
area A of Figure 3. Recruiting from jobseekers experiencing more than th periods of 
unemployment leads to increasing hiring costs for the firm. Therefore the government 
                                                 
13 We do not elaborate the optimal size of  th’ here. 
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needs to allocate a subsidy to firms who take on unemployed experiencing 
unemployment spells ranging from th to say tr > th – the subsidy range then covers the 
area A. Introducing a subsidy for employers who take on unemployed out of the range 
th to tr, can be seen as a shift of the screening device standard – cf the shift from th to tr 
in Figure 7. Therefore the additional hiring costs of firms who have to recruit from the 
complete subsidy range th to tr equal H(tr) – H(th), cf equation (11).  
As hiring costs keep on increasing to the right of th, the subsidy has to depend on 
unemployment duration positively, to ensure that firms take into consideration all 
unemployed experiencing unemployment spells ranging from th to tr.14 
Finally, since the subsidy leads to the selection of persons whose productivity meets 
the standard ph, the worker occupies a permanent job. 
Subsidy to school unemployed workers 
Besides extending the search process for a qualified worker, the firm can also 
decrease the productivity standard and use the subsidy to upgrade the productivity of 
the hired jobseeker to the originally required productivity level. Figure 7 illustrates 
that decreasing required productivity from ph to pr, means that the firm takes more 
unemployed (tr-th) into consideration. Hence allocating subsidies to firms who use the 
subsidy to school workers also leads to job opportunities for unemployed who are 
excluded otherwise. Lowering ph to pr, induces the firm to adapt th to tr. That is, the 
optimal screening device standard shifts to the right. Now the firm finds it optimal to 
recruit up to tr, hence the subsidy can be uniform.15 
Although the design of the subsidy differs between both options, the outcome is the 
same: by means of the subsidy, employers recruit from long-term unemployed and 
find qualified personnel within this group. Moreover, in both cases they will continue 
to employ the workers after the termination of the subsidy as they meet the firm’s 
ability standard. 
 
                                                 
14 Moving to the right of th means that hiring costs increase as the gains in terms of more arrivals do not 
outweigh the losses in terms of rejections during assessments. 
15 The level of the subsidy depends on the costs of schooling, which we take for granted here.  
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Figure 7 The impact of employment subsidies 
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4 Employment subsidies: the case of the Netherlands 
The two oil shocks in the seventies that hit the Dutch economy, caused unemployment 
rates to increase to levels unprecedented in the post war period. Although the 
unemployment rate decreased gradually, it did not fall back to pre oil shock levels. 
Consequently, long-term unemployment increased rapidly and remained high 
throughout the nineties. The use of employment status as a screening device is 
probably one of the driving forces behind this long-term inactivity. 
The Dutch authorities observed the problem unemployed faced and increased the use 
of ALMP (both in financial terms as in terms of volumes). Prime objective of ALMP 
was mobilizing long-term unemployed. A typical example of ALMP was the so-called 
Melkert1 project, which aimed at 40,000 subsidised jobs for long-term unemployed in 
the public sector. The objective of this program was to meet the needs of both 
unemployed and society (the subsidized jobs were created in socially valuable sectors 
short of personnel). The government justified the use of ALMP to help long-term 
unemployed escape social isolation and grant their right to work. We will entitle this 
by “equity justification”.16  
                                                 
16 As opposed to efficiency justification, which refers to using ALMP to repair market failures. 
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The emphasis on equity arguments also appeared from the design of the programs. 
The subsidy period was often unlimited, which assured that long-term unemployed 
did not fall back in isolation, but it did not help as an outflow stimulus. The subsidy 
projects were mainly created in the public sector, which indeed led to socially 
valuable work, but the work to be done, contributed little to increasing the 
productivity level of participants which would be useful in finding a non-subsidized 
job. Hence it was no surprise that the results in terms of outflow to unsubsidised 
employment were disappointing – cf Welters (1998). However, as this was no primary 
objective of ALMP, low outflow rates were no major concern to policymakers. 
This justification should be compared to the “efficiency justification”, which 
primarily focuses on the unemployed in area A of Figure 3, i.e. aims at reducing errors 
of type 2. An example of the latter is the Melkert2-project. This program provides 
temporary subsidies for taking on long-term unemployed to employers in the private 
sector only. This programme was a reaction to the tightening of the labour market in 
the nineties. We show that deadweight losses are a serious problem here. 
Finally the Dutch government has changed it policy towards profiling, i.e. targeting 
the unemployed. This policy primarily aims at reducing the type 1 errors. We show 
that this policy is highly successful in principle, but that deadweight loss might 
become a serious problem again. 
The equity justification: low deadweight loss  
The success rate of employment subsidies depends, amongst other factors, on the type 
of jobseekers that enter the program. If the government requires firms to select from 
long-term unemployed close to the right of th, the success rate will be higher than 
firms having to recruit from unemployed experiencing unemployment spells 
considerably larger than th (for example the subsidy range from tr to tr’ in Figure 8). 
The more the subsidy range shifts to the right, the higher the subsidy has to be to 
induce firms to participate, as hiring costs increase. Something, which is typically not 
found in reality. In the present example of Figure 8, there would not be a subsidy level 
high enough to induce firms to recruit from the range tr to tr’, since there are no 
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unemployed in this range that meet the productivity standard. This is probably one of 
the reasons why Melkert1 jobs were created in the public sector.17 
When the unemployed close to th are targeted, efficiency arguments come to the fore 
and one should beware of the deadweight loss. Deadweight loss equals the share of 
participants in employment subsidies that would have found a job without the 
subsidy. However, the risk of provoking deadweight loss by subsidizing the Melkert1 
unemployed is low. In particular when the government really succeeds in targeting the 
range tr to tr’ in Figure 8, and thus also can correctly identify tr. It is obvious that this 
is not always the case. In particular the improved situation on the labour market in the 
1990s and the increased dynamics made it more difficult for the government to 
determine the subsidy range and increased the deadweight loss risk. Moreover, the 
increased labour market tightness caused a change from an equity to an efficiency 
justification of active labour market policies.  
Figure 8 Targeting unemployed and deadweight loss 
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The efficiency justification: deadweight loss 
During the late nineties the labour market became much tighter. As a result of falling 
unemployment rates the share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment 
                                                 
17  An alternative would of course be to provide schooling subsidies. 
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started to decline, though at a slow rate. Besides equity arguments to help long-term 
unemployed, a second argument arose: employers are in need of personnel. Tightness 
on the labour market meant that firms could not easily fill their vacancies, though at 
the same time there was a core group of unemployed. Government policy changed 
from the Melkert1-project to the Melkert2-project, which was focused on the private 
sector and intended to match long-term unemployed to vacancies. The merits of this 
type of ALMP come much closer to the ALMP as we discussed in section 3. 
However, deadweight loss then becomes a serious problem. 
Minimizing deadweight loss is important, as it constitutes a waste of subsidy 
transfers. A government that uses employment subsidies should not only care about 
maximizing the success rate but it should at the same time try to minimize deadweight 
loss. Figure 8 shows that with respect to the latter the ideal situation would be, a 
government knowing th and setting the subsidy range from th to for instance tr. If it 
does so, no unemployed would find a subsidized job she would have found in the 
absence of the subsidy, hence no deadweight loss. However, if the government does 
not know th and accidentally sets the subsidy range from th’ to tr, deadweight loss 
equals F/(F+G). 
A factor, which is often overlooked in the policy discussion, is that the increased 
labour market tightness induced employers to relax their selection standards for 
unemployed. In the Netherlands policymakers hardly adapted the subsidy range to 
increasing tightness. The entrance criterion remained “one year out of unemployment” 
throughout the nineties. This has increased the apparent success rates of the subsidies, 
but at the expense of deadweight loss. 
In the Annex we show how indeed increased labour market tightness will lead to an 
increase in the optimal screening device standard th* for the employers. This rightward 
shift of th* following an increase in tightness affects the success of employment 
subsidies, as firms are more willing to participate. However, this increased interest of 
firms to participate stems from the fact that they receive subsidies for unemployed 
they would have taken on without the subsidy.  
Figure 8 also illustrates the deadweight loss as labour market tightness increases. 
Government starts the subsidy range at th’, which coincides with the initial value of 
th*. Hence initially there is no deadweight loss. However, as labour market tightness 
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increases, th* shifts to the right to for example th. A government that now does not 
shift the subsidy range accordingly, will induce the development of deadweight loss, 
which amounts F/(F+G).  
Profiling unemployed: more successful 
Although, the Dutch authorities did not change the subsidy range following the 
changing stance of the labour market, they implemented other measures to adapt to 
the changing environment. The allocation of long-term unemployed towards the 
various programs became more structured. Employment Offices set up profiles of 
unemployed (“fasering”), which provide the distance unemployed face to the labour 
market. These profiles determine the reemployment probabilities of long-term 
unemployed, based on individual characteristics (education level, occupation, age 
etc.). Profiling enables policymakers to allocate unemployed to the program that suits 
them best – see for example Kooreman (1999). That is, if the outcome is that 
unemployed face severe difficulties to find employment, programs like the Melkert1-
project (the name changed into “In-/Doorstroom banen”) are still available. But if 
these difficulties appear to be less severe other alternatives are available, ranging from 
temporary employment subsidies at private sector firms to re-schooling possibilities.  
Profiling offers unemployed a tailor-made solution, but not only unemployed will 
benefit from successful profiling. Also employers will benefit from profiling as 
profiles offer employers a clear indication of what to expect from unemployed.  
In our model, profiling plays the role of decreasing the uncertainty margin of the 
screening device if Employment Offices succeed in filtering out the most promising 
long-term unemployed. In our analysis this means that the lower bound of the 
uncertainty margin shifts up, following the provision of additional information about 
the qualities of long-term unemployed. Less uncertainty, means less failures during 
the assessment procedures and hence total assessment costs go down, for a given 
screening device standard. Figure 9 illustrates that the additional information reduces 
area B to area B’. However, as a result of reduced risk, firms shift the screening device 
standard to the right, from th to th’, thereby taking more unemployed into 
consideration. This shift causes deadweight loss to arise, if the government does not 
adapt the subsidy range. Hence not only targeting needs to be done cautiously, the 
government also needs to monitor external labour market developments. 
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Figure 9 The impact of profiling: more success 
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5  Conclusion 
Using a Pissarides stochastic job model, we showed that employers use employment status as 
a screening device to minimize hiring costs during hiring procedures. The use of this device 
leads to the exclusion of long-term unemployed in hiring decisions and leads to market 
failures. 
A well-tried policy measure to help long-term unemployed is employment subsidies. 
There are two independent reasons why firms participate in employment subsidy 
schemes. Firms use the subsidy as compensation for extended search among long-
term unemployed or firms use the subsidy to school long-term unemployed up to the 
required level. Both applications of the subsidy open job opportunities for long-term 
unemployed. However, the design of the employment subsidy should be different. 
When firms extend their search process, the level of the subsidy should depend on 
unemployment duration whereas when the firm uses it to school workers the subsidy 
should be uniform. 
We discussed three changes that influence the success rate of employment subsidies, 
using the Dutch experience as an example. One is related to the economy: increased 
tightness. Increased tightness does lead to more success, but at the expense of 
deadweight loss if the government does not adapt the subsidy categories. The second 
and third change, are related to the employment subsidy policy: targeting of 
 22
unemployed to the right program and profiling job seekers. Targeting leads to an 
improvement of the ability of the subsidy to help long-term unemployed back to 
employment. However, targeting leads to the emergence of deadweight loss if 
targeting is not executed carefully. The effects of profiling are comparable to the 
effects of increased tightening; they lead to deadweight loss.  
Hence not only targeting and profiling need to be implemented cautiously, 
government also should adapt the design of employment subsidies to changes in 
labour market tightness. 
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Appendix 
The distribution function x(p,t) and f(p) have a clear link, which we will explain in 
this appendix. Figure A1 shows two cross sections of x(p,t) namely x(p;t+1) and 
x(p;t+2). Obviously, x(p;t+2) is to the left of x(p;t+1) as skills deteriorate following 
an additional period of non-use. The figure also shows that high skilled unemployed 
suffer more from productivity depreciation than low skilled unemployed. We also 
included the hiring standard, ph, in the figure to illustrate that the part of the 
unemployed in each segment that meets ph decreases as the unemployment spell 
prolongs. 
Figure A1 Decreasing th leads to a shift in x(p;t) 
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The effects (in terms of increasing the probability to find a qualified jobseeker) of 
decreasing the hiring standard (from t+2 to t+1) are visualized in Figure A2. 
Excluding jobseekers experiencing t+2 periods of unemployment, means that the left 
tale of f(p) shifts to the right as the lowest available productivity level increases from 
pmin(t+2) to pmin(t+1). As is apparent from x(p;t+2) in Figure A1, the vast majority of 
jobseekers in this segment does not meet the hiring standard, ph, only a small fraction 
does. Hence if a firm excludes this segment from the hiring procedure, unqualified 
jobseekers are excluded disproportionably, which is the very nature of the screening 
device. In Figure A2, this means that the peak of f(p) shifts to the right.  
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Figure A2 Excluding segments of x(p,t) leads to a shift in f(p) 
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To determine the probability to find a qualified jobseeker after imposing a screening 
device standard, th=t+1, we need to define f(p;0,t+1).18 The distribution function 
f(p;0,t+1) consists of two parts, an upward sloping part and a downward sloping part. 
We define the upward sloping part as: 
(A1) min
min min
( 1)( ;0, 1)
mod( ; 1) ( 1) mod( ; 1) ( 1)
u p tpf p t
e t p t e t p t
++ = −+ − + + − +  
Where mod(e) is a function of the modus ability level of the jobseekers who survived 
the screening device standard. This function depends on the effectiveness (in terms of 
discriminatory power to distinguish qualified jobseekers from unqualified) of the used 
screening device. Clearly the stricter th is set, the higher the discriminatory power is 
(eth>0). However, for small values of th, ethth<0 as firms start making a considerable 
amount of “type 1 errors”: excluding qualified jobseekers.   
The downward sloping part is defined as: 
(A2) max
max max
(0)( ;0, 1)
(0) mod( ; 1) (0) mod( ; 1)
d p pf p t
p e t p e t
+ = −− + − +  
Determining the probability to find a qualified worker after imposing th =t+1 comes – 
in the specific case of Figure A2 – down to integrating equation A2 from ph to pmax(0), 
which is equation (10) in the paper. 
                                                 
18 If th=t+1, all jobseekers who experience spells of unemployment of t>t+1 are excluded from the 
hiring procedure.  
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Our model shows that there are two types of hiring costs, the costs of the assessment 
procedure k and foregone productivity z. Increasing tightness does not directly 
influence costs k. However, it has a direct effect on total z costs as an increase in 
tightness leads to a drop in the contact rate, which increases the number of periods 
needed to fill the vacancy. Hence, the optimal screening device standard is influenced 
by labour market tightness. To show this mathematically, we first need to define the 
functions 1-F0,th(ph) and S(th) out of section 2. The former represents the probability to 
have a successful assessment, which depends negatively on th. Therefore we replace it 
by a function ν(th). The probability to meet the screening device standard depends 
positively on th (or negatively on sharpening th). Therefore we replace the integral 
S(th) by a function σ(th). For notational convenience we choose some simple 
representations: 
(A3) 
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Important to see is that γ<0, which assures that decreasing (sharpening) the screening 
device standard leads to an increase of the probability that someone who enters the 
assessment procedures meets the hiring standard. Moreover, η>0, which assures that 
decreasing the screening device standard leads to a reduction of the number of 
candidates that enter the assessment procedure. 
Substituting both equations into equation (11), and maximizing to th yields the 
optimal th. Moreover, after some reshuffling, this optimality condition can be 
represented as a second representation of σ called σ2.  
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Now we have two expressions for σ (σ1 and σ2). These two equations can then be used 
to derive dth/dθ: 
(A5) 
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This derivative is only positive whenever decreasing the hiring standard leads to a 
bigger decrease in accuracy of the screening device than the increase it provokes in 
 29
the inflow rate into the hiring procedure, hence η+γ>0. Henceforward in our model, 
firms will accept a somewhat higher failure rate during the assessment procedure as 
long as the contact rate increases, which reduces total foregone productivity costs. 
This derivative also shows the impact costs z and k have on the relation between 
tightness and the optimal screening device standard. The per period costs of not filling 
a vacancy z and the per period costs of assessment procedures σq(θ)k influence the 
magnitude of the derivative. The higher costs z in comparison to per period 
assessment procedure costs, the more a firm will increase its screening device 
standard as the labour market tightens. 
